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Abstract—A bot is a piece of software that is usually installed 
on  an  infected  machine  without  the  user’s  knowledge.  A  bot 
is controlled remotely by the attacker under a  Command and 
Control structure. Recent statistics show that bots represent one 
of the fastest growing threats to our network by performing 
malicious activities such as email spamming or keylogging. 
However, few bot detection techniques have  been developed to 
date.  In  this  paper,  we  investigate  a  behavioural  algorithm  to 
detect a single bot that uses keylogging activity. Our approach 
involves the use of function calls analysis for the detection of the 
bot with a keylogging component. Correlation of the frequency of 
function calls made by the bot with other system signals during 
a specified time-window is performed to enhance the detection 
scheme.  We  perform  a  range  of  experiments with  the  spybot. 
Our results show that there is a high correlation between some 
function calls executed by this bot which indicates abnormal 
activity in our system. 
Index Terms– API function calls, Bot, Correlation, IRC 
 
I.  INT RODUC T ION 
 
For some time now, computers face different types of attacks 
by malicious programs such as viruses and worms[11][22]. A 
more recent threat is the presence of large numbers of com- 
promised machines, known as bots, working in a coordinated 
manner [13].  A bot, a  term derived from robot, is  a  piece 
of  malicious software  that  is  installed  on  a  user  machine, 
usually  without  his  knowledge. This  malicious  software  is 
programmed to  respond to  various instructions remotely by 
the attacker through Command and Control (C&C) structure, 
often using the Internet Relay Chat (IRC) network as a 
communication channel. These instructions command the bot 
on the infected machine to perform malicious activities. The 
malicious activities include vulnerability scans to spread the 
bot  to  other  systems,  email  spamming,  keylogging, packet 
sniffing, phishing, rootkits and identity theft. 
A bot spreads and propagates to other hosts by exploiting 
known vulnerabilities in operating systems and applications. 
The target host is infected by different means ranging from 
worms, email viruses or phishing [21]. Once the bot is installed 
on a victim’s machine, it changes the system configuration 
to start itself each time the system boots. A bot might have 
the functionality to spread itself by sending out more emails 
or scanning more computers, thus, infecting other vulnerable 
machines. After that, the bot connects to the IRC server and 
joins  the  specified Command and  Control  channel. Having 
joined the channel, the bot either executes the channel topic as 
a default command or remains inactive waiting for botmaster 
commands. The botmaster communicates with the bot through 
IRC protocol[1]. The IRC protocol is a preferred due to its 
flexibility in the management and control of bots. Additionally, 
the  IRC  protocol  provides  the  attackers  with  anonymous 
control over their bots. The botmaster can also control the bots 
using different types of communications such as  the HTTP 
protocol or through Peer to Peer networks. 
Initially, bots were used to coordinate attacks across a 
network of bot-infected machines. Nowadays, most bots are 
implemented with keylogging features. Keylogging is a mean 
of intercepting and subversively monitoring the user activities 
such as typing keystrokes and mouse clicking. The intercepted 
keystrokes are either saved to a log file or sent directly to the 
botmaster. The log file can be sent to  the attacker through 
email, ftp  or  accessed remotely by  the  attacker. Other new 
features added to the keylogging bot are the ability to capture 
screen shots, and mouse logging [14]. 
Keylogging represents a serious threat to the privacy and 
security of our systems. This is because the keylogger program 
can collect the user’s personal information, passwords, credit 
cards or other sensitive information. Unlike other attacks 
performed by the bot, keylogging is difficult to detect as it runs 
in hidden mode. Many Anti-Virus packages cannot detect a 
stealthy keylogger running on the system. The user has no way 
to determine if his machine is running a keylogger, therefore, 
he could easily become a victim of the identity theft. 
The focus of bot detection research is the analysis of net- 
work traffic. To the best of our knowledge, no attempt has been 
made within bot detection research to detect a single bot by 
monitoring Application Programming Interface (API) function 
calls. In this paper, we present an algorithm to detect a single 
bot in  the  system based on correlating different behaviours 
by monitoring specified API function calls  executed by the 
bot to perform keylogging activity. Invoking these functions 
withing specified time window might represent a security risk 
to computer systems. For example, calling GetKeyboardState 
or GetAsyncKeyState by a program and writing data to a file 
using the WriteFile function call usually indicates a keylogging 
activity. In addition, the bot is designed to send the intercepted 
keystrokes to the attacker, therefore, we may notice a large 
volume of outgoing traffic during this period. Correlation of 
the frequency of function calls generated by the bot during a 
specified time-window could indicate abnormal activity in our 
system. Overall, we believe that tracking and correlating the 
keyboard events with other behaviour data such as accessing 
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files  or  sending  packets  will  enhance  the  process  of  bot 
detection. 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the effect of cor- 
relating different behaviours of  a  single bot  represented by 
API  function calls  within  specified time-window. We  focus 
on  three  types  of  bot  behaviour:  keylogging  activity,  file 
access and outgoing traffic. Our results show that correlating 
different behaviours of a single bot enhance the bot detection 
mechanism. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: section 
two presents different algorithms used to detect bots and 
keylogging activities. It also shows the problems which face 
the  current  detection  systems.  Section  three  discusses  the 
design and implementation of our bot detection. In addition, 
it explains different types of experiments that we perform to 
our bot detection. We discuss our results in section four. We 
conclude and present our future work in section five. 
 
II.  RELAT E D WORK 
There are only a few existing techniques for bots detection. 
Most  of  these  techniques use  signature-based detection  by 
analysing network traffic [10][9]. Although analysing network 
traffic using a signature-based approach is a useful mechanism 
for bot detection, it becomes more difficult if the botmaster’s 
commands are encrypted. Different research performed by 
Binkley [7] uses anomaly-based detection to  detect the be- 
haviour of the bot. The anomaly detection technique looks for 
the deviation from a defined normal traffic. In this section, we 
will present current related work in bot detection techniques 
and the associated problems. 
Recent work by Barford [5] represents a good introduction 
to  understanding and  analysing the  behaviours of  the  bots. 
Most  of  the  research  conducted  in  this  area  concentrates 
on detecting botnets rather than an individual bot [10][9][2] 
and, to  the best  of our knowledge, little  research has been 
performed in  this  area.  Freiling  et  al.  [10][13]  use  a  non- 
productive resource such as honeypot to collect bot binaries. 
Their approach is based on allowing the infected honeypot to 
emulate the bot activities and analysing network traffic to shut 
down the remote control network. Although honeypots allow 
administrators to look at security events in more detail, they 
cannot detect these events without receiving activity directed 
against them [3]. In addition, the process of emulating the bot 
action to penetrate the remote network can be discovered if the 
botnet size is relatively small. To avoid these problems, our 
work focuses on monitoring API function calls generated by 
the bot and correlates these function calls within a specified 
time-windows to detect malicious activities. In addition, host- 
based detection is used to investigate the presence of the bot 
in our system. 
Cooke  et  al.  [9]  detect  bots  by  analysing the  communi- 
cations between bots, and the communications between bots 
and their controllers. They also investigate the bots payloads 
using the pattern matching of known bot commands and look 
for  the  behavioural characteristics of  bots  that  differ  from 
non-human characteristics. They conclude that bots can run 
on non-standard ports and that analysing encoded packets is 
very  costly  on  high  throughput networks.  Hence,  there  are 
no simple characteristics of the bots communication channels 
that can be used for detection. They also discuss the approach 
of  detecting bots  by  their  propagation or  attack  behaviour 
by  correlating  data  from  different  sources.  However,  they 
have not designed a correlation algorithm to show results of 
this investigation. In this paper, we present one approach of 
detecting bots based on correlating the frequency of different 
bot’s behaviour such as keyboard events, files access and the 
amount of outgoing traffic. 
An  approach for  the  analysis  of  IRC  usage  by  bots  is 
presented by Stephane Racine [21]. This approach detects bots 
by  finding inactive  clients  through  monitoring  IRC  PONG 
messages  and  assigning  them  to  a  connection. The  active 
clients are then classified according to the channel that they 
join. This approach is successful in detecting idle IRC activity, 
but suffers from high false positive rates. In addition, searching 
for IRC patterns can be costly when inspecting every packet 
and could slow the detection mechanism. Furthermore, apply- 
ing pattern matching is difficult when data is encrypted [9]. We 
believe that monitoring and correlating different API function 
calls will enhance the process of bots detection through this 
correlation. 
Research in keylogging has shown that is difficult to detect 
but the literature on this topic is also sparse. TAN [23] suggests 
disabling some function calls used by the keylogger such as 
SetWindowsHookEx, GetKeyboardState and GetKeyState. This 
can prevent the proper functioning of keyloggers. However, 
disabling these functions will prevent legitimate software from 
using these functions. In our work, we monitor calls to some of 
these functions and other functions. Monitoring calls to these 
functions will not affect their use by legitimate programs. 
Other research suggests that embedding a sequence of 
random characters between successive keys typed on the 
browser will make the keylogging process difficult [12]. An- 
other  group  [6]  disassembles all  running processes  search- 
ing  for  SetWindowsHookEx used  by  some  keyloggers. One 
problem with  this  method  is  that  the  keylogger developers 
can  use  different  methods  to  log  the  user  activities  other 
than using SetWindowsHookEx. In addition, disassembling all 
processes searching for SetWindowsHookEx is a tedious task. 
Our approach is based on monitoring selected API  function 
calls for all running processes in our system in user mode. 
By  monitoring these functions, we will avoid the problems 
mentioned above. 
 
III.  BOT DET ECTION 
 
A. Introduction 
 
Existing research techniques detect the presence of bots via 
network monitoring. Rather than attempting to detect bots via 
network monitoring, our work focuses on a single bot detection 
on a machine by monitoring and correlating different activities 
on the system represented by executing different API function 
calls that may indicate the presence of a bot on the system. 
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The API function calls executed by the bot is monitored in 
a user-based environment. Our monitoring program intercepts 
API function calls in the user-based environment. Direct 
invocation kernel-based API functions will not be monitored 
by  our  intercepting  program.  Monitoring  kernel-based API 
function calls will be investigated in our future work. 
In order to detect the bot in the system different bot 
behaviours are  correlated to  have  a  high  correlation value, 
which is represented by Spearman’s Rank Correlation (SRC) 
value [8].  In  our case,  if  the  Spearman’s Rank Correlation 
value  exceeds the  threshold  level  of  0.5,  we  have  a  high 
correlation between the two different behaviours which may 
 
Algorithm 1: Bot Detection Algorithm using Spearman’s 
Rank Correlation (SRC) 
 
if KeyboardState function(s) is executed (i.e. keylogging activity) then 
if SRC[KeyboardState,CommFunc] > Threshold and 
SRC[KeyboardState,FileAccess] > Threshold then 
Strong detection 
else if SRC[KeyboardState,CommFunc] < 
SRC[KeyboardState,FileAccess] < Threshold then 
Weak detection 
else if (SRC[KeyboardState,CommFunc] < Threshold and 
SRC[KeyboardState,FileAccess] > Threshold) or 
(SRC[KeyboardState,CommFunc] > Threshold and 
SRC[KeyboardState,FileAccess] < Threshold) then 
Normal detection 
else 
 
reflect malicious activity in our system. The threshold level of 
0.5 or more represents a strong correlation between two events 
according to the Speaman’s Rank Correlation algorithm. We 
 
end 
No detection and normal activity is considered 
hypothesize that one behaviour may not be enough to detect 
malicious activity. This is explored in section IV. For example, 
one behaviour of the bot is to send the intercepted informa- 
tion from the keylogging process to the botmaster once the 
botmaster  issues  the  keylogging command. The  intercepted 
information is sent to the botmaster if the user of the infected 
machine  hits  [ENTER]  key,  or  closes  the  active  window. 
This action represents normal behaviour. Correlating different 
actions enhance the process of detection. We are aware that 
different keyloggers use different techniques to intercept and 
store the keystrokes. Our work examines a keylogging activity 
as our goal is to detect a bot rather than a keylogger. 
 
B. Aims 
 
The  aim  of  our  experiments is  to  verify the  notion  that 
correlating different behaviours of a single process which 
produces multiple API function calls within a specified time- 
window, indicates abnormal activity. In addition, we apply the 
monitoring and  correlation scheme  to  a  normal application 
(e.g. mIRC client) to verify that the normal application exe- 
cutes different function calls from the malicious process which 
results in having different correlation value. 
 
C.  Design and Implementation 
 
In our research, we focus on monitoring selected API 
function calls executed by bots that perform the keylogging 
task and send the intercepted keystrokes directly to the IRC 
channel. To accomplish this task, we implement a program to 
monitor some API function calls executed by the bot when 
receiving commands from the botmaster. We focus on three 
types of API function calls: 
•  Communications   Functions (CommFunc):   socket, 
send, recv, sendto, recvfrom, and IcmpSendEcho [20]. 
•  File Access Functions (FileAccess): CreateFile, Open- 
File, ReadFile, and WriteFile[18]. 
•  Keyboard State  Functions (KeyboardState): GetKey- 
boardState, GetAsyncKeyState, GetKeyNameText, and 
keybd event[19]. 
We have implemented a ‘hook’ program to capture the API 
functions executed by the bot. Hooking API functions is the 
process of intercepting events (messages, keystrokes, mouse) 
before they reach an application[15][16]. 
In our work, we captured selected API functions such as 
GetKeyboardState, and GetAsyncKeyState used by bots which 
implement  keylogging  feature.  For  example,  the  spybot[5] 
is  used  for  its  ability  to  intercept the  user’s  keystrokes by 
invoking GetAsyncKeyState. We  search  for  all  the  running 
processes in our system and inject our hooking program into 
the running processes. An API hook is based on modifying the 
process Import Address Table [4] to point to the replacement 
function instead of the original function. Thus, we were able 
to  capture the functions made by  the bot when it  receives 
commands from the botmaster. 
We store the captured functions in a log file for further 
processing. We use a Spearman’s Rank Correlation formula [8] 
to find the correlation between different behaviours of the bot 
such as intercepting the user keystrokes and sending it directly 
to the IRC channel within specified time-window. In addition, 
we also correlate the events of intercepting the user keystrokes 
and file access. Our results show that the combination of these 
correlated events can indicate suspicious activity in our system. 
The algorithm of detecting the bot is described in Algo- 
rithm 1. 
 
D. Architecture 
To perform our experiments, we set up a small virtual IRC 
network on a VMWare machine. The VMWare machine runs 
under a Windows XP P4 SP2 with a 2.4GHz processor and 
1GB RAM. The virtual IRC network consists of two machines. 
One machine runs Windows XP Pro SP2 and it is used as an 
IRC server. The other machine runs Windows XP Pro SP2 as 
an infected machine with spybot [5]. We do not have to have 
a large network to implement our algorithm as our work based 
on detecting the behaviour of a single bot on a machine. 
 
E. Experiments 
We have performed five experiments to verify our notion. 
In the first experiment (E1), we allow the spybot to connect 
to the IRC server and join the channel without receiving any 
commands from the botmaster. In the second experiment (E2), 
we follow the same procedure as in the first experiment, but in 
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this case the botmaster issues different commands to the bot, 
excluding the keylogging activity. Note that our target machine 
in these experiments is an idle infected machine. That is, the 
user does not use the infected machine for any activity. 
In the third experiment, we allow the bot to connect to 
IRC  server  and  join  the  specified channel. The  bot  on  the 
infected machine monitors the user’s typing activity, but does 
not send any information to the botmaster. We monitor two 
scenarios of typing. In the first scenario (E3.1), the user types 
long sentences while in the second scenario (E3.2), the user 
types short sentences. By monitoring two typing scenarios, we 
are able to show the effect of different user’s activity on our 
detection scheme. 
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In  the  fourth  experiment,  once  the  bot  connects  to  the 
IRC  server  and  joins  the  channel, the  botmaster  starts  the 
keylogging activity. The same procedure is  taken  as  in  the 
third experiment where we have two scenarios of typing: long 
sentences (E4.1) and short sentences (E4.2). 
The fifth and the final experiment (E5) involves applying the 
monitoring program to another application (mIRC client [17]) 
to verify that mIRC client behaves differently from the bot. 
Each  experiment is  performed five times  which  is  suffi- 
cient  as  the  results from  the  repeated experiments produce 
only small variations by using Chebyshevs Inequality due to 
network delay and through using VMWare. Therefore, we 
select a random experiment from the repeated experiments as 
the base experiment. Each experiment runs for 15 minutes in 
order to collect a reasonable number of function calls which 
reflect most of botmaster execution commands. The monitored 
API functions are saved into  a  log file. After that, we use 
a  Spearman’s Rank  Correlation (SRC)  method  to  correlate 
different behaviour of the bot based on the frequency of API 
function calls  executed by  the  bot  in  our  system  within  a 
specified time-window. In our experiments, a time-window of 
ten seconds is used between function calls samples. We notice 
that monitoring function calls for a time-window of 60 seconds 
will have variant idle periods depends on the bot activity. An 
idle period is where no bot activity is detected and zero values 
are assigned. Therefore, using a time-window of ten seconds 
reduces the idle periods suitably. 
Our assumption is that calling GetAsyncKeyState or 
GetKeyboardState functions by an unknown running program 
may  represent abnormal keylogging activity  in  our  system. 
However, we  consider that  calling  these  functions generate 
only a ‘weak’ alert because other programs may use the same 
API calls. Therefore, we use Spearman’s Rank Correlation to 
correlate different types of bot behaviour which enhances our 
detection algorithm to form a ‘strong’ alert. 
The Spearman’s Rank Correlation correlates two different 
data sets. The first data set is the outgoing traffic from our 
system (i.e., total number of bytes sent to the botmaster every 
ten seconds) and the frequency of GetAsyncKeyState function 
calls generated. The second data set is the frequency of GetA- 
syncKeyState function calls  and  the  frequency of  WriteFile 
function calls generated. These function calls are important for 
monitoring bot behaviour because their invocation represents 
Fig. 1.    The results of experiment E1. The bot connects to the IRC server, 
joins the specified channel and remains inactive waiting for the botmaster’s 
commands. 
 
 
abnormal behaviour within our system. 
 
IV.  RE SULT S AN D ANA LY S I S 
 
In this section, we analyse the results of the experiments 
described  in  Section  III-E.  For  all  experiments, the  x-axis 
represents time  in  seconds  while  the  y-axis  represents the 
normalized value of functions. The normalized function fre- 
quency call values represent the total value we get during 10 
seconds divided by the maximum value of the whole period 
(900 seconds). In addition, we use a line graph which connects 
the points to make our figures more readable. 
In experiment E1, the bot is  idle for the majority of the 
duration. This means that no API function calls are executed 
except  the  communication functions,  specifically, send  and 
recv, as shown in Figure 1. From Figure 1, we notice that it 
is difficult to detect the bot’s behaviour as there is no activity 
in the system except the communications. We also notice that 
there is a burst in the outgoing traffic. This burst is generated 
due to spybot program which sends a  bulk of words every 
specified time intervals. 
In experiment E2, the botmaster issues commands such as 
info, list and passwords and the bot on the infected machine 
responds to these commands. Each time the botmaster issues 
a command, different API function calls are executed by the 
bot. In this experiment, we noticed an increased amount of 
outgoing traffic compared to experiment E1. In addition, few 
WriteFile  and  ReadFile  functions are  generated during this 
experiment. Conversely, no GetAsyncKeyState function calls 
are generated, as shown in Figure 2. 
The third experiment has two typing scenarios: (1) Long 
sentences (E3.1) and (2) Short sentences (E3.2). Figure 3 
represents the long sentences scenario E3.1. We notice that 
even though we have many GetAsyncKeyState function calls 
executed  by  the  bot,  which  indicates  keylogging  activity, 
there is almost no correlation between GetAsyncKeyState and 
WriteFile. This is because the WriteFile function call is rarely 
generated as  it  is  only triggered when  the user  types long 
sentences. To save the long sentences, the user has to press the 
Enter key or close the application. In addition, no data is sent 
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Fig. 2.    The results of experiment E2. The bot receives commands from the 
botmaster. The amount of outgoing traffic increases as the bot responds to the 
botmaster’s commands. 
Fig. 4.    The results from the third experiment - scenario E3.2. The botmaster 
has not activated the keylogger command. The user on the infected machine 
types short sentences. 
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Fig. 3.    The results from the third experiment - scenario E3.1. The botmaster 
has not activated the keylogger command. The user on the infected machine 
types long sentences. 
Fig. 5.    The first scenario E4.1 in experiment four. The botmaster activates 
the keylogger. The user on the infected machine types long sentences. 
 
 
to the botmaster which reduces the correlation value between 
GetAsyncKeyState and the outgoing traffic. In scenario E3.2, 
the user of the infected machine types short sentences. We 
can see from Figure 4 that there is a high correlation between 
GetAsyncKeyState and WriteFile function calls. This situation 
is  expected  as  each  time  the  user  types  short  sentences, 
the functions GetAsyncKeyState and WriteFile are called to 
intercept the user keystrokes and store them in a file. However, 
there is still no traffic sent out and hence there is no correlation 
1 
 
0.8 
 
0.6 
 
0.4 
 
0.2 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 
Time[sec] 
with outgoing traffic. 
In experiment 4, the botmaster starts the keylogging activity 
 
  send GetAsyncKeyState 
 
  WriteFile 
 
  Bytes Sent 
and the intercepted keystrokes are sent to the botmaster. In this 
case, we also have two typing scenarios: (1) Long sentences 
(E4.1) and (2) Short sentences (E4.2). In scenario E4.1, we 
expect there to  be a  high correlation between the outgoing 
traffic and GetAsyncKeyState. However, the result from Fig- 
ure 5 shows that there is a low correlation between the two. 
This is because we correlate the two events (typing and saving 
to a file) in two different 10 second time intervals. In addition, 
the long sentences increase the idle time, and therefore reduce 
the  correlation value.  Moreover, a  low  correlation between 
GetAsyncKeyState and  WriteFile  is  noticed.  This  situation 
is expected as the user types long sentences which call few 
 
Fig. 6.   The second scenario E4.2 in experiment four. The botmaster activates 
the keylogger. The user on the infected machine types short sentences. 
 
 
WriteFile functions. 
In the second scenario E4.2, the user types short sentences 
resulting in  a  high  correlation between the  outgoing traffic 
with the GetAsyncKeyState function and between the GetA- 
syncKeyState function and the WriteFile function as shown 
in Figure 6. The high correlation in both cases increases the 
amount of evidence for a bot spying on our system. 
In addition, we test our monitoring program with the mIRC 
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sidered  if  the  Spreaman’s  Rank  Correlation  value  exceeds 
the  threshold  (0.5).  Conversely, a  low  correlation  value  is 
considered if the Spearman’s Rank Correlation value is below 
the threshold. 
From Table I, we see a perfect correlation of GetAsyncK- 
eyState and WriteFile function calls in experiment E1. The bot 
called neither of these functions during its inactive period. We 
also notice that there is a high Spearman’s Rank Correlation 
value  between the  outgoing traffic (Bytes  Sent)  and  GetA- 
syncKeyState because the amount of outgoing traffic is equal 
each time. This traffic belongs to the PONG message generated 
by  the  bot  to  avoid  disconnection  from  the  IRC  server. 
Therefore, the correlation value is expected to be high as well. 
Fig. 7.    The results from Experiment E5. The mIRC client connects to the 
IRC server. The client has normal conversation and simple commands with 
another client. 
 
 
program. The result in Figure 7 is optimistic as the program 
did not call any GetAsyncKeyState or GetKeyboardState func- 
tions. 
Table I represents the value of Spearman’s Rank Correlation 
between the two data sets, (GetAsyncKeyState, Bytes 
Sent) and (GetAsyncKeyState, WriteFile), in each 
experiment. In  this  table,  we  have  two  sets  of  results.  In 
the first set S1, we correlate all the captured data from our 
algorithm including the idle period. In this period, no activity 
is seen, therefore, we assign a zero value to this period. This is 
represented by the with zero column in Table I. In the second 
set S2, we remove all the idle periods which have zeros and 
apply the Spearman’s Rank Correlation to the new data. The 
reason for having the two sets is that we notice that having the 
idle periods in our data increases the correlation value. This 
is because there are many places where no activity is noticed 
in both data sets, which may produce inaccurate correlation. 
Therefore, we wanted to investigate the effect of having no 
idle periods. Although we notice a reduction of the correlation 
value by 0.35 in most cases when we remove the idle periods, 
it gives us more accurate results. 
The API Keylogging Activity column represents the situa- 
tion  where the  process calls  any function used  to  intercept 
the keystrokes such as GetAsyncKeyState, GetKeyboardState, 
GetKeyNameText and  keybd  event.  Calling  these  functions 
may indicate a keylogger activity. As a result, we classify our 
detection scheme into four cases: 
•  No detection (N/A): the case where no keylogging activ- 
ity is detected. 
•  Weak  detection (Weak): the  case  where  a  keylogging 
activity is detected but a low correlation is noticed in 
both data sets. 
•  Normal detection (Normal): the case where a keylogging 
activity is detected but a high correlation is noticed in 
one data set. 
•  Strong detection (Strong): the case where a keylogging 
activity is detected but a high correlation is noticed in 
both data sets. 
As mentioned in section III-A, a high correlation is con- 
In experiment E2, the high Spearman’s Rank Correlation value 
is due to the correlation of GetAsyncKeyState and WriteFile 
which are not invoked and zero values are assigned. 
In experiment E3.1, we notice a call to GetAsyncKeyState 
which indicates abnormal activity. On the other hand, a low 
Spearman’s Rank Correlation value is generated in both data 
sets. This situation is expected because the user types long 
sentences  which  make  only  a  few  calls  to  WriteFile.  In 
addition no information is sent to the botmaster. As a result, 
a weak detection is indicated. Experiment E3.2 detects a 
keylogging activity and generates a high correlation between 
GetAsyncKeyState and WriteFile executed by the bot due to 
typing  short  sentences.  On  the  other  hand,  no  information 
is  sent  to  the  botmaster  which  results  in  normal detection 
according to our classification. 
Experiment E4.1 shows similar activity to experiment E3.1 
where the user types long sentences, but the information is sent 
to the botmaster. We expect to have a high correlation between 
the outgoing traffic and GetAsyncKeyState function. The result 
shows there is no significant difference from experiment E3.1. 
This is because the bot sends the information when the user 
finishes typing long sentences. Experiment E4.2 is the best 
case for detecting keylogging activity in our system. In this 
experiment, we  detect the  keylogging activity and we have 
high  correlation values  for  both  data  sets  which  indicates 
abnormal activity running in our network. 
The last experiment E5 in Table I shows the result of the 
Spearman’s Rank  Correlation correlation on  monitoring the 
mIRC client. Even though we have a high correlation value 
before and after removing idle periods on both experiments, 
we did not detect the use of keylogging function calls. The 
high  correlation  value  between  outgoing  traffic and  GetA- 
syncKeyState relates to the number of of idle periods due to 
the delay in responding to another client’s messages. 
In  summary,  we  notice  that  some  experiments  produce 
high  correlation  values.  There  are  many  reasons  for  this. 
The  first reason  is  that  different  events  occur  in  different 
time-windows. Therefore, our algorithm produces inaccurate 
results. The second reason is that we have many idle periods 
in  our  data  sets.  The  idle  periods  increase  the  correlation 
value which affect our detection scheme. In order to improve 
our detection scheme, we  need to  apply a  more intelligent 
correlation scheme. 
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iments with 
zeros 
without 
zeros 
with 
zeros 
without 
zeros 
Activity 
existence
Detection 
confidence
(S1) (S2) (S1) (S2) 
E1 0.863 0.671 1.000 1.000 No N/A
E2 0.648 0.498 0.967 0.897 No N/A
E3.1 0.509 0.183 0.559 0.172 Yes Weak
E3.2 0.423 -0.003 0.928 0.618 Yes Normal
E4.1 0.506 0.189 0.560 0.089 Yes Weak
E4.2 0.927 0.579 0.957 0.663 Yes Strong
E5 0.594 0.499 0.983 0.958 No N/A
TABLE I 
S PE A R M A N ’S RANK COR R E LAT I O N (SRC) VA LU E W HI CH RE P R ES ENTS 
THE C ORRELAT I ON B ETW EEN TW O  DATA  S ETS . 
 
correlating different activities within the same time window. 
For future work, we will use the Artificial Immune system 
correlation algorithm to detect the Peer-to-Peer bots. 
Exper- 
SRC(GetAsyncKey, 
Bytes Sent) 
SRC(GetAsyncKey, 
WriteFile) Keylog. API 
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